



ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO ASSIST WITH RANSOMWARE CRYPTANALYSIS

Alexander Adamov
*CEO/Founder at NioGuard Security Lab,
Lecturer at NURE and BTH Universities*



Before

How can I engage my students
in anti-malware research?



Problem: Ransomware Analysis

Ransomware attack investigation questions:

- Which cipher was used in an attack?
- How does a ransomware generate encryption key(s) and where stores them for future decryption?
- Is it possible to obtain or generate a decryption key or create a decryption tool?

Problem - 2

Custom or hardcoded
ciphers in ransomware

```
0048DAE4  
0048DAE4  
0048DAE4 ; MoneroPay Ransomware  
0048DAE4 ;  
0048DAE4 ; Attributes: bp-based frame  
0048DAE4  
0048DAE4 Salsa20_QuaterRound proc near  
0048DAE4  
0048DAE4 arg_0= dword ptr 8  
0048DAE4  
0048DAE4 push ebp  
0048DAE5 mov ebp, esp  
0048DAE7 push esi  
0048DAE8 push ebx  
0048DAE9 mov esi, [ebp+arg_0]  
0048DAEC mov ebx, [esi]  
0048DAEE add ebx, [ecx]  
0048DAF0 rol ebx, [ecx]  
0048DAF3 xor ebx, [ecx]  
0048DAF5 mov [edx], ebx  
0048DAF7 add ebx, [ecx]  
0048DAF9 rol ebx, 9  
0048DAFC xor ebx, [ecx]  
0048DAFE mov [ecx], ebx  
0048DB00 add ebx, [edx]  
0048DB02 mov edx, ebx  
0048DB04 rol edx, 0Dh  
0048DB07 xor edx, [esi]  
0048DB09 mov [esi], edx  
0048DB0B add edx, [ecx]  
0048DB0D pop ebx  
0048DB0E pop esi  
0048DB0F pop ebp  
0048DB10 ror edx, 0Eh  
0048DB13 xor [eax], edx  
0048DB15 retm  
0048DB15 Salsa20_QuaterRound endp  
0048DB15
```

1

```
0040A315  
0040A315  
0040A315 ; Attributes: bp-based frame  
0040A315  
0040A315  
0040A315 GLOBDecryptConfig proc near  
0040A315  
0040A315 arg_0= dword ptr 8  
0040A315 arg_4= dword ptr 0Ch  
0040A315 arg_8= dword ptr 10h  
0040A315 arg_C= dword ptr 14h  
0040A315  
0040A315 push ebp  
0040A316 mov ebp, esp  
0040A318 push esi  
0040A319 push [ebp+arg_C]  
0040A31C push [ebp+arg_0]  
0040A31F call 0040A320  
0040A324 xor esi, edi  
0040A326 cmp [ebp+arg_8], esi  
0040A329 jle short loc_40A33E
```

2

```
0040A32B push edi  
0040A32C mov edi, [ebp+arg_4]
```

```
0040A32F  
0040A32F loc_40A32F:  
0040A32F call RC4_PRGA  
0040A334 xor [esi+edi], al  
0040A337 inc esi  
0040A338 cmp esi, [ebp+arg_8]  
0040A33B jl short loc_40A32F
```

```
0040A33D pop edi
```

```
0040A33E  
0040A33E loc_40A33E:  
0040A33E pop esi  
0040A33F pop ebp  
0040A340 retm 10h  
0040A340 GLOBDecryptConfig endp  
0040A340
```

```
0040283D  
0040283D |  
0040283D loc_40283D: ; GlobeImposter Ransomware  
0040283D mov ebx, [edi+1Ch] ; AES Key Expansion  
00402840 movzx eax, bl  
00402843 mov edx, [edi+0Ch]  
00402846 movzx ecx, Sbox[edx]  
0040284D movzx eax, byte ptr [edi+1Fh]  
00402851 shl ecx, 8  
00402854 movzx eax, Sbox[edx]  
00402858 xor ecx, eax  
0040285D movzx eax, byte ptr [edi+1Eh]  
00402861 shl ecx, 8  
00402864 movzx eax, Sbox[edx]  
00402868 xor ecx, eax  
0040286D movzx eax, byte ptr [edi+1Dh]  
00402871 shl ecx, 8  
00402874 movzx eax, Sbox[edx]  
00402878 xor ecx, eax  
0040287D mov eax, [edi+4]  
00402880 xor ecx, ss:Rcon[ebp]  
00402886 add ebp, 4  
00402889 xor ecx, [edi]  
0040288B lea edi, [edi+20h]
```

3

The young researcher

Kateryna Vitiuk - a master student at NURE, Ukraine

- Studies Cyber Security at NURE
- Interested in anti-ransomware research
- Is developing a distributed ledger-based system for her graduation work.



Scope

Ransomware with hardcoded ciphers

- AES-NI, XData
- Locky
- **TeslaCrypt**
- **GlobelImposter**
- **MoneroPay**
- GandCrab
- ...

Out of scope

- AES-NI
- XData
- Locky

```
__asm
{
    aesenc    xmm2, xmm4
    aesenc    xmm0, xmm4
}
v20 += 16;
_XMM4 = _mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)v20);
__asm
{
    aesenc    xmm2, xmm4
    aesenc    xmm0, xmm4
}
a3 -= 32;
v20 += 16;
_XMM4 = _mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)v20);
__asm
{
    aesenc    xmm2, xmm4
    aesenc    xmm0, xmm4
}
v20 += 16;
_XMM4 = _mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)v20);
__asm
{
    aesenc    xmm2, xmm4
    aesenc    xmm0, xmm4
}
v20 += 16;
_XMM4 = _mm_loadu_si128((const __m128i *)v20);
```

TeslaCrypt 2.1 - File encryption

Session AES-256-CBC key is generated and stored in the memory

```
00414F94 lea    eax, [ebp+var_2120]
00414F9A push   eax
00414F9B push   offset dword_442330
00414FA0 call   AESKeyExpansion
00414FA5 mov    eax, [ebp+var_212C]
00414FAB lea    ecx, [ebp+var_2120]
00414FB1 push   ecx
00414FB2 mov    ecx, [ebp+var_2124]
00414FB8 lea    edx, [ebp+var_24]
00414FBB push   edx
00414FBC push   eax
00414FBD push   ebx
00414FBE call   EncryptAES
00414FC3 add    esp, 18h
00414FC6 cmp    eax, 1
00414FC9 jnz    short loc_415002
```

dword_442330	dd	0AF01D1A0h
dword_442334	dd	0BC28E32h
dword_442338	dd	0C8523522h
dword_44233C	dd	7A75234Ch
dword_442340	dd	65849531h
dword_442344	dd	7CA33265h
dword_442348	dd	250FA763h
dword_44234C	dd	5850B33Eh
aG	db	'g', 0

```
00422B55 loc_422B55:
00422B55 add    ebp, 10h
00422B58 mov    esi, [ebp+8]
00422B5B mov    edi, [ebp+0Ch]
00422B5E push  ebp
00422B5F rol    ebx, 10h
00422B62 movzx  ebp, cl
00422B65 xor    esi, dword_43E001+3[ebp*8]
00422B6C movzx  ebp, dh
00422B6F xor    esi, dword_43E001+2[ebp*8]
00422B76 movzx  ebp, bh
00422B79 xor    esi, dword_43E001[ebp*8]
00422B80 movzx  ebp, dl
00422B83 xor    edi, dword_43E001+3[ebp*8]
00422B8A movzx  ebp, ah
00422B8D xor    edi, dword_43E001+2[ebp*8]
00422B94 movzx  ebp, bl
00422B97 xor    edi, dword_43E001+1[ebp*8]
00422B9E movzx  ebp, al
00422BA1 mov    ebp, dword_43E001+3[ebp*8]
00422BA8 shr    ebx, 10h
00422BAB and    eax, 0FFFF0000h
00422BB0 or     eax, ebx
00422BB2 shr    edx, 10h
00422BB5 movzx  ebx, ah
00422BB8 xor    ebp, dword_43E001+2[ebx*8]
00422BBF movzx  ebx, dh
00422BC2 xor    ebp, dword_43E001[ebx*8]
```


TeslaCrypt 2.1 - C&C traffic encryption

```
.data:0041B5B2 push    edi                ; string constant
.data:0041B5B3 mov     eax, esi           ; eax = size of string constant
.data:0041B5B5 lea    ecx, [esp+64h]
.data:0041B5B9 mov     dword ptr [esp+64h], 6A09E667h
.data:0041B5C1 mov     dword ptr [esp+68h], 0BB67AE85h
.data:0041B5C9 mov     dword ptr [esp+6Ch], 3C6EF372h
.data:0041B5D1 mov     dword ptr [esp+70h], 0A54FF53Ah
.data:0041B5D9 mov     dword ptr [esp+74h], 510E527Fh
.data:0041B5E1 mov     dword ptr [esp+78h], 9B05688Ch
.data:0041B5E9 mov     dword ptr [esp+7Ch], 1F83D9ABh
.data:0041B5F1 mov     dword ptr [esp+80h], 5BE0CD19h
.data:0041B5FC mov     dword ptr [esp+8Dh], 0
.data:0041B607 call   AddStringConstant

aEwterw1Ktjwert1 db 'ewterw1;ktjwert1;ewrt;we1rkwert',0
```

ESI 0000001F
EDI 00FC2C10 debug046:aEwterw1Ktjwert1
EBP 0141FFB4 Stack[000000E4]:0141FFB4
EIP 0041B607 .data:0041B607
EFL 00000216


SHA-256

Hardcoded AES-256-CBC key:

```
0141E2E8 37 D5 FA EE 1D 3F 9E D3 E0 31 3F 1E DC 4F 18 45
0141E2F8 F7 08 AD 61 6D E5 C0 C9 B7 A6 D8 5B EC 3C 2F 01
```

IV: DEADBEEF0000BEEFDEAD0000BEEFDEAD

GlobeImposter - Config extraction



```
v0 = AllocMem(32);
SHA256(
  (int)"B231B717113902E9F788C7BD0C7ABABAF9B173A7F6B432076B82CBCB7C8149F3CF2F55A80
  0x200u,
  v0,
  0);
dword_40CFE8 = sub_40264F(1331152, 2048);
dword_40CFEC = sub_40264F(1333224, 2048);
dword_40CFE0 = sub_40264F(1335304, 2484);
unk_146008 = 0;
GetModuleFileNameW(0, 1331152, 2048);
GetEnvironmentVariableW(L"temp", 1333224, 2048);
DecryptConfig(v0, (int)dword_4013E0, 34, 0x200u);
DecryptConfig(v0, (int)dword_401404, 38, 0x200u);
dword_40CBC0 = sub_40968A((int)dword_4013E0, 0);
dword_40CBC8 = DecryptConfig_2((int)dword_401148, (int)&dword_40CBC4, v0, 661);
dword_40D098 = DecryptConfig_2((int)dword_401430, (int)&dword_40CA98, v0, 512);
if ( !GetEnvironmentVariableW(L"appdata", &v17, 2048) )
  goto LABEL_2;
lstrcatW(&v17, L"\\");
v1 = PathFindFileNameW(1331152);
lstrcatW(&v17, v1);
v2 = lstrcmpiW(1331152, &v17);
v16 = (int)&v17;
if ( v2 )
{
  LOBYTE(v3) = GetFileAttributes((int)&v17);
  if ( !v3 && !CopyFileW(1331152, &v17, 0) )
    goto LABEL_8;
  v16 = (int)&v17;
}
AddToAutorunKey(v16);
```

```
68 v8 = CreateKeyFile(v6);
69 if ( v8 )
70 {
71   --v7;
72   Sleep(1000);
73 }
74 }
75 while ( v7 > 0 && v8 );
76 if ( v7 < 1
77 || (v9 = AllocMem(3466),
78     ZeroMemory(v9, 0, 3466),
79     sub_4024E8(v9, (int)&word_40D74A, 3466),
80     DecryptConfig(v0, v9, 3466, 0x200u),
81     (v10 = StrStrA(v9, "{{IDENTIFIER}}") == 0) )
82 LABEL_2:
83   ExitProcess(1);
84   v11 = strlenA "{{IDENTIFIER}}");
```

0000921C | 80

Hex View-1

0014d508	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	05 01 28 01 12 07 1E 00!.(....
0014d518	3C 21 44 4F 43 54 59 50	45 20 48 54 40 4C 20 50	<!DOCTYPE=HTML-P
0014d528	55 42 4C 49 43 20 22 20	2F 2F 57 33 43 2F 2F 44	UBLIC:~/W3C/DD
0014d538	54 44 20 48 54 4D 4C 20	34 2E 30 31 2F 2F 45 4E	TD=HTML-4.01//EN
0014d548	22 20 22 68 74 74 70 3A	2F 2F 77 77 77 2E 77 33	""http://www.w3
0014d558	2E 6F 72 67 2F 54 52 2F	68 74 6D 6C 34 2F 73 74	.org/TR/html4/st
0014d568	72 69 63 74 2E 64 74 64	22 3E 00 0A 3C 68 74 6D	riect.dtd">..<htm
0014d578	6C 3E 00 0A 20 20 3C 68	65 61 64 3E 00 0A 20 20	l>...</head>..
0014d588	20 20 3C 6D 65 74 61 20	63 68 61 72 73 65 74 3D	..<meta charset=
0014d598	22 75 74 66 20 38 22 3E	00 0A 20 20 20 20 3C 74	"utf-8">.....<t
0014d5A8	69 74 6C 65 3E 64 66 74	77 3C 2F 74 69 74 6C 65	itle>dftw</title
0014d5B8	3E 00 0A 20 20 3C 2F 68	65 61 64 3E 00 0A 20 20	>...</head>..
0014d5C8	3C 62 6F 64 79 3E 00 0A	3C 63 65 6E 74 65 72 3E	<body>..<center>
0014d5D8	00 0A 3C 62 72 3E 00 0A	20 20 20 20 3C 64 69 76<div
0014d5E8	3E 3C 68 32 3E 59 6F 75	72 20 66 69 6C 65 73 20	>h2>Your files
0014d5F8	61 72 65 20 45 6E 63 72	79 70 74 65 64 21 3C 2F	are Encrypted</
0014d608	68 32 3E 3C 2F 64 69 76	3E 00 0A 3C 64 69 76 3E	n2></div>..<div>
0014d618	00 0A 3C 64 69 76 3E 46	6F 72 20 64 61 74 61 20	..<div>For data
0014d628	72 65 63 6F 76 65 72 79	20 6E 65 65 64 73 20 64	recovery-needs-d

GlobeImposter - File encryption



Generated AES-256 file
keys using SHA-256

IV = SHA256 (File size
& 800000Fh4)



```
1. v3 = a1;
2. v4 = *(_DWORD *) (a1 + 4);
3. v5 = *(_DWORD *) v4 ^ (*(_BYTE *) a2 | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 1) | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 2) | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 3) << 8) << 8) << 8));
4. v32 = *(_DWORD *) v4 ^ (*(_BYTE *) a2 | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 1) | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 2) | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 3) << 8) << 8) << 8));
5. v6 = *(_DWORD *) (v4 + 4) ^ (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 4) | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 5) | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 6) | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 7) << 8) << 8) << 8));
6. v4 += 8;
7. v35 = *(_DWORD *) v4 ^ (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 8) | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 9) | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 10) | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 11) << 8) << 8) << 8));
8. v33 = v6;
9. v4 += 4;
10. v7 = *(_DWORD *) v4 ^ (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 12) | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 13) | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 14) | (*(_BYTE *) (a2 + 15) << 8) << 8) << 8));
11. v8 = v4 + 4;
12. v37 = v7;
13. for ( i = *(_DWORD *) v3 >> 1) - 1; i > 0; --i )
14. {
15. v9 = *(_DWORD *) v8 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v5] ^ dword_40B570[v37 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v33 >> 8] ^ dword_40B170[((unsigned int)v35 >> 16) & 0xFF];
16. v10 = v8 + 4;
17. v11 = v9;
18. v12 = *(_DWORD *) v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v33] ^ dword_40B570[(unsigned int)v5 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v35 >> 8] ^ dword_40B170[(v37 >> 16) & 0xFF];
19. v10 += 4;
20. v13 = v12;
21. v14 = *(_DWORD *) v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v35] ^ dword_40B570[v33 >> 24] ^ dword_40B170[((unsigned int)v5 >> 16) & 0xFF] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v37 >> 8];
22. v10 += 4;
23. v15 = *(_DWORD *) v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v37] ^ dword_40B570[(unsigned int)v35 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v32 >> 8] ^ dword_40B170[(v33 >> 16) & 0xFF];
24. v10 += 4;
25. v16 = *(_DWORD *) v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v11] ^ dword_40B570[(unsigned int)v15 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v12 >> 8] ^ dword_40B170[((unsigned int)v14 >> 16) & 0xFF];
26. v10 += 4;
27. v32 = v16;
28. v17 = *(_DWORD *) v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v13] ^ dword_40B570[v11 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v14 >> 8] ^ dword_40B170[((unsigned int)v15 >> 16) & 0xFF];
29. v10 += 4;
30. v33 = v17;
31. v35 = *(_DWORD *) v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v14] ^ dword_40B570[v13 >> 24] ^ dword_40B170[(v11 >> 16) & 0xFF] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v15 >> 8];
32. v10 += 4;
33. v18 = dword_40B570[(unsigned int)v14 >> 24] ^ dword_40AD70[(unsigned __int16)v11 >> 8] ^ dword_40B170[(v13 >> 16) & 0xFF];
34. v5 = v32;
35. v19 = *(_DWORD *) v10 ^ dword_40A970[(unsigned __int8)v15] ^ v18;
36. v8 = v10 + 4;
37. v37 = v19;
38. }
```

MoneroPay (SpriteCoin)



Ubiq ANN Bot

@ubiqannbot

Follow



[ANN] [SPR] Spritecoin Alpha Test
bitcointalk.org/index.php?topi...

9:35 PM - 6 Jan 2018

pagebin.com/xxqZ8VES

pagebin.com/xxqZ8VES


SpriteCoin

SpriteCoin is a new cryptocurrency written entirely in JavaScript (with C for the mining module). It uses the CryptoNight algorithm but is not cryptonote-based. With a max supply of 1 trillion coins and a block time of 45 seconds, this is sure to be a profitable coin for you (I hope).

[Download for Windows \(scan it with VirusTotal if you don't trust it\)](#)


MoneroPay

- A victim's computer name (%COMPUTERNAME%)
- A user name (%USERNAME%)
- A user profile strings (%USERPROFILE%)
- C&C address: jmqapf3nflatei35.onion




Salsa20
session
key

Encrypting:



Decrypting:



Signature-based detection

Ransomware	Symmetric cipher	Data source	Signature detection (Yara, KANAL PEiD)
GlobeImposter	AES-256-CBC; RC4, 16-byte key	PE file	List of primes, Big numbers, CryptGenKey import
		Memory dump	List of primes, Big numbers, CryptGenKey import, Rijndael_AES_CHAR, Rijndael_AES_LONG
TeslaCrypt	AES-256-CBC	PE file	N/A
		Memory dump	CryptGenKey import, Big numbers
MoneroPay	Salsa20, 32-byte key	PE file	N/A
		Memory dump	N/A

The proposed method

1. Obtaining patterns of the ciphers in ASM
2. Code normalization
3. Matching the crypto pattern in ransomware using the Bitap algorithm
 - `diff_match_patch.match_main(code, pattern, expected location)`
 - `diff_match_patch.Match_Threshold = 0.5` (default)
 - `diff_match_patch.Match_Distance = 1000` characters (default)
4. Obtaining diffs vectors using the Myer's algorithm for the matched patterns
5. Calculating the Levenshtein distance for diffs vectors
6. Comparing the found Levenshtein distances with the matching threshold
7. If the code is matched, add it to the library of the crypto patterns

Crypto patterns generation problem

Different compiler options:

- Optimization
 - /O1 - Minimize size
 - /O2 - Maximize speed
 - /Ox - Full optimization
- Security check (/GS-)
- Calling convention
 - /Gz - _stdcall
 - /Gd - _cdecl
 - /Gr - _fastcall
 - /Gv - _vectorcall
- Platform (x86/x64)

Size does matter

Salsa20 QR

No opt vs. Minimize size (O1)

```
; void __stdcall s20_quarterround(unsigned int *y0, unsigned int *y1, unsigned int *y2, unsigned int *y3)
s20_quarterround proc near
    ; CODE XREF: s20_rowround+321p
    ; s20_rowround+671p ...

y0      = dword ptr  8
y1      = dword ptr 0Ch
y2      = dword ptr 10h
y3      = dword ptr 14h

    push    ebp
    mov     ebp, esp
    push    ecx                ; shift
    mov     eax, [ebp+y0]
    mov     ecx, [eax]
    mov     edx, [ebp+y3]
    add    ecx, [edx]
    push    ecx                ; value
    call   rotl
    mov     ecx, [ebp+y1]
    xor    eax, [ecx]
    mov     edx, [ebp+y1]
    mov     [edx], eax
    push    9                  ; shift
    mov     eax, [ebp+y1]
    mov     ecx, [eax]
    mov     edx, [ebp+y0]
    add    ecx, [edx]
    push    ecx                ; value
    call   rotl
    mov     ecx, [ebp+y2]
    xor    eax, [ecx]
    mov     edx, [ebp+y2]
    mov     [edx], eax
    push    00h               ; shift
    mov     eax, [ebp+y2]
    mov     ecx, [eax]
    mov     edx, [ebp+y1]
    add    ecx, [edx]
    push    ecx                ; value
    call   rotl
    mov     ecx, [ebp+y3]
    xor    eax, [ecx]
    mov     edx, [ebp+y3]
    mov     [edx], eax
    push    12h               ; shift
    mov     eax, [ebp+y3]
    mov     ecx, [eax]
    mov     edx, [ebp+y2]
    add    ecx, [edx]
    push    ecx                ; value
    call   rotl
    mov     ecx, [ebp+y0]
    xor    eax, [ecx]
    mov     edx, [ebp+y0]
    mov     [edx], eax
    pop     ebp
    retn   10h

s20_quarterround endp
```

```
Salsa20_cut_sizeopt.txt - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
; ===== SUBROUTINE =====
; Attributes: bp-based frame

; void __stdcall s20_quarterround(unsigned int *y0, unsigned int *y1, unsigned int *y2, unsigned int *y3)
s20_quarterround proc near
    ; CODE XREF: s20_doubleround+161p
    ; s20_doubleround+281p ...

y0      = dword ptr  8
y1      = dword ptr 0Ch
y2      = dword ptr 10h
y3      = dword ptr 14h

    push    ebp
    mov     ebp, esp
    mov     edx, [ebp+y1]
    mov     ecx, [ebp+y2]
    push    esi
    mov     esi, [ebp+y3]
    push    edi
    mov     edi, [ebp+y0]
    mov     eax, [edi]
    add    eax, [esi]
    rol    eax, 7
    xor    [edx], eax
    mov     eax, [edi]
    add    eax, [edx]
    rol    eax, 9
    xor    [ecx], eax
    mov     eax, [edx]
    add    eax, [ecx]
    rol    eax, 00h
    xor    [esi], eax
    mov     eax, [ecx]
    add    eax, [esi]
    rol    eax, 0Eh
    xor    [edi], eax
    pop     edi
    pop     esi
    pop     ebp
    retn   10h

s20_quarterround endp
```

Crypto patterns

Salsa20 QuarterRound
crypto block in MoneroPay
ransomware

'rol eax, 7' != 'rol ebx, 7'

Left Screenshot (Salsa20):

```
void __stdcall s20_quarterround(unsig
int *y2, unsigned int *y3)
s20_quarterround proc near

y0      = dword ptr  8
y1      = dword ptr  0Ch
y2      = dword ptr  10h
y3      = dword ptr  14h

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
mov     ecx, [ebp+y1]
mov     ecx, [ebp+y2]
push    esi
mov     esi, [ebp+y3]
push    edi
mov     edi, [ebp+y0]
mov     eax, [edi]
add     eax, [esi]
rol     eax, 7
xor     [edx], eax
mov     eax, [edi]
add     eax, [edx]
rol     eax, 9
xor     [ecx], eax
mov     eax, [ecx]
add     eax, [ecx]
rol     eax, 0Dh
xor     [esi], eax
mov     eax, [ecx]
add     eax, [esi]
ror     eax, 0Eh
xor     [edi], eax
pop     edi
pop     esi
```

Right Screenshot (sub_48DAE4):

```
sub_48DAE4 proc near
arg_0    = dword ptr  8

push    ebp
mov     ebp, esp
push    esi
push    ebx
mov     esi, [ebp+arg_0]
mov     ebx, [esi]
add     ebx, [eax]
rol     ebx, 7
xor     ebx, [edx]
mov     [edx], ebx
add     ebx, [eax]
rol     ebx, 9
xor     ebx, [ecx]
mov     [ecx], ebx
add     ebx, [edx]
mov     edx, ebx
rol     edx, 0Dh
xor     edx, [esi]
mov     [esi], edx
add     edx, [ecx]
pop     ebx
pop     esi
pop     ebp
ror     edx, 0Eh
xor     [eax], edx
retn
```

Annotations:

- Blue text: Salsa20 Opt: /O1
- Red text: MoneroPay ransomware
- Purple arrows pointing from 'rol ebx, 7' in the right screenshot to 'rol eax, 7' in the left screenshot.

Normalization


Replace all CPU registers names with 'operand' string

```
Listner - [d:\Home\NioGuard\VB\2018\Ciphers\Salsa20\Salsa20_...
File Edit Options Encoding Help
s20_hash      endp

s20_quarterround proc near
y0            = dword ptr 0
y1            = dword ptr 4
y2            = dword ptr 8
y3            = dword ptr C
push operand
mov operand, operand
mov operand, operand
mov operand, operand
push operand
mov operand, operand
push operand
mov operand, operand
add operand, operand
rol operand, 7
xor operand, operand
mov operand, operand
add operand, operand
rol operand, 9
xor operand, operand
mov operand, operand
add operand, operand
rol operand, 0Dh
xor operand, operand
mov operand, operand
add operand, operand
rol operand, 0Eh
xor operand, operand
pop operand

sub_48DAE4    proc near
arg_0        = dword ptr 8
push operand
mov operand, operand
push operand
push operand
mov operand, operand
mov operand, operand
add operand, operand
rol operand, 7
xor operand, operand
mov operand, operand
add operand, operand
rol operand, 9
xor operand, operand
mov operand, operand
add operand, operand
mov operand, operand
rol operand, 0Dh
xor operand, operand
mov operand, operand
add operand, operand
pop operand
pop operand
pop operand
ror operand, 0Eh
xor operand, operand
ret
```

Myer's diff algorithm



```
@@ -390,7 +396,7 @@ def run_test_payload(test_type):  
390 396         print "ERROR: Error happened when preparing the test. Shadows w  
391 397  
392 398         if test_type in ['MODIFY_SYSREGISTRY', 'LOCKY', 'THOR']:  
393 -         final_status = add_registry_key()  
399 +         registry_status = add_registry_key()
```

Diffs vectors & Levenshtein distance

(0, 'functionprocnearpushoperandmovoperand,operand')

(-1, 'movoperand,operandmovoperand,operandpushoperandmovoperand,')

(1, 'push')

(0,'operandpushoperandmovoperand,operandmovoperand,operandaddoperand,operandroloperand,7xoroperand,operandmovoperand,operandaddoperand,operandroloperand,9xoroperand,operandmovoperand,operandaddoperand,')

(1, 'operandmovoperand,')

(0, 'operandroloperand,0Dhxoroperand,operandmovoperand,operandaddoperand,operand')

(-1, 'ror')

(1, 'pop')

(0, 'operand')

(-1, ',0Ehxoroperand,')

(1, 'pop')

(0, 'operandpopoperand')

(-1, 'pop')

(1, 'roroperand,0Ehxor')

(0, 'operand')

(-1, 'pop')

(1, ',')

(0, 'operandret')

(-1, 'n10h')

(0, 'functionendp')

Levenshtein distance: 118 characters

Results

Recognizing AES (key expansion) in the TeslaCrypt ransomware

Iteration No	1	2	3	4	5
Expected location	0	1500	3000	10000	20000
Matched location	115	1473	2986	10006	19953
Levenshtein distance	95	60	93	76	75
Correct match in ransomware	FALSE	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE

Results

Recognizing AES (key expansion) in the GlobelImposter ransomware

Iteration No	1	2	3	4	5
Expected location	100	1000	4400	10000	20000
Matched location	399	999	4425	9968	19991
Levenshtein distance	61	113	50	132	91
Correct match in ransomware	FALSE	FALSE	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE

Results

Recognizing RC4 (PRGA) in the GlobelImposter ransomware

Iteration No	1	2	3	4	5
Expected location	0	500	800	1000	1500
Matched location	340	340	828	1063	1553
Levenshtein distance	20	20	76	75	83
Correct match in ransomware	TRUE	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE

Results

Recognizing Salsa20 (quatterround) in the MoneroPay ransomware

Iteration No	1	2	3	4	5
Expected location	0	100	1000	1500	3000
Matched location	2	100	1000	1500	3094
Levenshtein distance	118	146	177	619	389
Correct match in ransomware	TRUE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE	FALSE

Limitations

- Obfuscated code
- Packed code
- Differences in call trees (function hierarchy) require code roll out
 - [Workaround]: only small code patterns can be used
- The method strongly depends on the expected location of the crypto code

Conclusion

- It is possible to find the crypto primitives in ransomware with the given limitations.
- Master students can conduct research on malware and AI
- Using open source libraries prevents reinventing the wheel and boosts the research process

Acknowledgements

- Google
 - The Diff-Match-Patch libraries contributors
 - VirusTotal team
- Vlad Kolbasin, an AI/ML guru, GlobalLogic
- Dr. Anders Carlsson, General Manager of ENGENSEC project, BTH
- Prof. Vladimir Hahanov and Prof. Svetlana Chumachenko, NURE

References

- Research results:
<https://github.com/AlexanderAda/NioGuardSecurityLab/tree/master/RansomwareAnalysis/DiffMatchPatterns>
- The Google's Diff-Match-Patch libraries repository, <https://github.com/google/diff-match-patch>
- Crypto Yara rules:
 - <https://github.com/Yara-Rules/rules/tree/ae82fb6e1e3145a85f52c4856985f7743796aae6/Crypto>
 - <https://github.com/x64dbg/yarasigs>
 - <https://github.com/polymorf/findcrypt-yara>
- PEiD Tool, <http://peid.has.it>
- Ransomware samples
 - TeslaCrypt: [9e3827dffc24d1da72cb3d423bddf4cd535fa636062e4ea63421ef327fec56ad](https://github.com/AlexanderAda/NioGuardSecurityLab/tree/master/RansomwareAnalysis/DiffMatchPatterns)
 - GlobelImposter: [a0e5bced56025f875721043df981c400fc28e4efc68ffe42ac665633de085ab1](https://github.com/AlexanderAda/NioGuardSecurityLab/tree/master/RansomwareAnalysis/DiffMatchPatterns)
 - MoneroPay: [ababb37a65af7c8bde0167df101812ca96275c8bc367ee194c61ef3715228ddc](https://github.com/AlexanderAda/NioGuardSecurityLab/tree/master/RansomwareAnalysis/DiffMatchPatterns)