

#### A Testing Methodology for Rootkit Removal Effectiveness Virus Bulletin 2007

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- Quick look at some current malware testing methods
  - How these approaches will not work for rootkit testing
- Types of threats this testing will (and will not) cover
  - Persistent vs. Non-persistent
- Tools needed to conduct testing
- Testing method step-by-step
  - Note To be used for testing not discovery

#### Some current testing methods



- Flat file scanning
  - Basic scanning of static files
- On demand scanning
  - Test to determine if malware can be blocked before it can get on the system properly
    - Downloaded from the web
    - Move or copy operations on static files

#### Some current testing methods



- Files are not executed
- Doesn't reflect real-world scenarios

In order to fully test the detection AND removal capabilities of the product, you must execute the threats!

- Not always an easy task
  - Takes time and resources
- But it must be done in order to have a complete and comprehensive review of the product

nantec.



- Need to monitor the system for all changes made by the threat after execution
- Tools used to capture these changes are well know and proven
  - But will they work for rootkit testing???
- You cannot and SHOULD NOT rely on the product under test to TELL you the results of their actions (detection and removal)
  - Use independent tools for proper verification

#### **Rootkits**



#### > User mode

- System hooking in user/application space
- Needs to perform the patching of all running applications

#### Kernel mode

- System hooking in system/kernel space
- Depending on technique, only needs to patch one place in the system

#### > Others – some PoC (proof-of-concept)

- VMware based (SubVirt Software, Blue Pill Hardware)
- PCI Creating a persistent rootkit in the System BIOS via ACPI



Table 2: List of malware and security risks that use rootkit techniques to hide files, processes or registry keys. In some cases it is possible to observe completely different rootkit techniques used by variants of the same family (e.g. Backdoor/Graybird). Some malware, like W32/Loxbot.A@mm, contain a modified copy of FU rootkit (msdirectx.sys) embedded in their code.

Name	T	hreat Catego	ry		Rootkit Characteristics				
	Worm /Virus	Backdoor /Trojan	Adware/ Spyware	DLL/IAT hooking	SDT/IDT hooking	DKOM	Use SYS driver	Use "Physical Memory"	
Adware/Elitebar			X	Х					
Adware/CommonName			Х		Х		Х		
Spyware/Search			Х		Х		Х		
Spyware/Elpowkeylogger			X		Х		Х		
Spyware/Apropos.C			Х	Х	Х		Х		
Backdoor/Graybird a		X			Х		Х		
Backdoor/Haxdoor <b>a</b>		X			Х		Х		
Backdoor/Darkmoon <sup>a</sup>		X			Х		Х		
Backdoor/Berbew <sup>a</sup>		X		Х	Х		Х		
Backdoor/Ryejet <sup>a</sup>		X			Х		Х		
Trojan/Drivus		X			Х		Х		
PWSteal/Raidys		X			Х		Х		
W32/Spybot.NLX	Х				Х		Х		
W32/Theals.A@mm	Х			Х					
W32/Tdiserv.A	Х				Х		Х		
W32.Mytob.AR@mm					Х		Х		
W32.Loxbot.A@mm	Х				Х		Х		
W32.Myfip.H@mm	Х					Х		Х	
W32.Fanbot.A@mm	X					Х		Х	

a - Data refers to the threat family, not just an individual threat.



- Two types of threats to deal with but only one can be covered by this testing method
  - Persistent Will create/drop/leave traces on the system that can survive a reboot
  - Non-persistent Will not create/drop/leave traces on the system and will not survive a reboot.

#### Traces consist of file and registry changes

Persistent threats will be covered since we can monitor the changes with our tools

#### Tools



#### > Tools

- Monitoring
  - Filemon/Regmon (now ProcessMonitor)
  - System modification (File/Registry) tool (e.g. Regshot)
  - GMER
  - ICESword
- Offline
  - BartPE Live Windows BootCD (Created by Bart Lagerweij)
  - Alien Registry Viewer
  - File compare/diff program (e.g. Windiff)

#### **Testing method**



- Need to employ 'forensic' type techniques during testing
  - Offline analysis of filesystem and registry
- Regular monitoring tools could miss most changes
  - Most tools use Windows API calls (which can be bypassed)
  - Some tools could be targeted by the threat and become ineffective
- Some anti-rootkit tools will work for some threats
  - Pros and Cons will be highlighted

#### **Anti-Rootkit tools Pros and Cons**



#### Pros

- Most are free
- Most are easy to use
- Most will find quite a few of the rootkit threats currently in the wild

### Cons

- Some are not as clear in their reporting as to what they find
- Quite a few are written by rootkit authors themselves
- Popular anti-rootkit tools are targeted by some rootkits

#### **Monitoring tools Pros and Cons**



#### Pros

- Most are free
- Most are easy to use
- Will find almost all changes made to the system

#### Cons

- You might not find all the changes, and that is IMPORTANT
- Some tools are targeted and the threats will not perform all of their nefarious actions



- Using offline analysis Baseline snapshot
  - Boot system with BootCD
  - For the filesystem...
  - Create a text file with filesystem directory listings using the cmd program
    - X:\i386\System32>dir /s /a /b /o C:\ > base.txt
      - Use an UPPER CASE letter for the systemroot drive (e.g. C:\). This will help when using the diff program later.
      - Obviously this doesn't have to be an UPPER CASE letter, but it must be consistent for each snapshot.



Using offline analysis – Baseline snapshot

- For the registry...
- Copy on-disk registry HIVES
  - Located here → %WINDOWS%\System32\config
  - User profile → Documents and Settings\<user>\NTUSER.dat

#### Windiff issues with 'small' changes...



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- Using offline analysis Infection snapshot
  - Boot system back to normal state
  - Execute rootkit sample(s)
  - Restart system and boot up again with BootCD
  - Create a text file with filesystem listings
    - X:\i386\System32>dir /s /a /b /o C:\ > infect.txt
  - Copy on-disk registry HIVES
    - %WINDOWS%\System32\config
    - Documents and Settings\<user>\NTUSER.dat

#### **Testing method**



#### Using offline analysis

- Boot system back to normal state
- Run a FULL system scan with the product under test
- Record results from the product
- Note any issues with the test system during/after scan

# Watch for system errors (from threat or product)







#### Using offline analysis – Cleaned snapshot

- Boot system with BootCD
- Create a text file with filesystem listings
  - X:\i386\System32>dir /s /a /b /o C:\ > clean.txt
- Copy on-disk registry HIVES
  - %WINDOWS%\System32\config
  - Documents and Settings\<user>\NTUSER.dat

#### **Testing method**



#### Using offline analysis

- Use ARV (Alien Registry Viewer or similar) to export each registry image gathered during testing
  - Base image
  - Infected image
  - Cleaned image





#### Using offline analysis

- Run file compare/diff program on exported registry HIVES and filesytem directory listings.
  - Base vs. Infected listings for 'what was added by the threat'
  - Infected vs. Clean listings for 'what was removed by the product'

#### **Testing method**



#### Reporting the results

- Why we need all the traces/changes
- Can be broken into buckets for reporting percentages
  - Critical files and registry keys/values
  - Non-critical files/registry
- Was rootkit scanning on by default good one to note for consumers

#### **Testing method**



#### Reporting the results

- Higher percentages don't always mean a better score
  - Product A removed 80% of the traces but missed critical files
  - Product B removed 70% of the traces but only missed non-critical files



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#### Symantec.





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			ADDED KEY Registry\HKEY_LOCAL_	MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLS	ID\{0482E074-C5B7-101A-82E0-08002B36A	333}\PersistentHandler
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		ΠΙ	ADDED KEY Registry\HKEY_LOCAL_	MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\msg	file\PersistentHandler	
		1	ADDED KEY Registry\HKEY_LOCAL_	MACHINE\SOFTWARE\CviP2ACmf03	m	
			Registry\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SO New Data: 1 Old Data: -	FTWARE\Microsoft\EventSystem	_ \{26c409cc-ae86-11d1-b616-00805fc7921	6}\Subscriptions\{14661AE2-610E-4
			Registry\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SO	FTWARE\Microsoft\EventSystem	\{26c409cc-ae86-11d1-b616-00805fc7921	6}\Subscriptions\{14661AE2-610E-4 •







FrvRegEdit - FrvReg - [FrvReg]

<u>File E</u> dit <u>V</u> iew <u>F</u> avorites <u>H</u> elp			
🤔   🗞 🎨 🦚 i 🚟 🏢 🟠 🔍			
🖻 💼 Software 📃	Name	Туре	Data
💼 7-Zip	(Default)	REG_SZ	H4JUVVUVVWV.79MI6EUVVUkXV0
🗄 📄 ActiveState	a) AutoUpdater	REG_SZ	C:\WINDOWS\system32\fsqeamci.exe
E	DientName	REG_SZ	C:\Program Files\Insworks\cmuleacc
Classes	🔣 CrMnTmt	REG_DWORD	0x0036ee80 (3600000)
	Device	REG_SZ	\\.\Udfsock
	<b>b</b> DriverName	REG_SZ	SSDSnap
	DriverPath	REG_SZ	C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\kmi
Em Rak	<b>a</b> HDI	REG_SZ	C:\WINDOWS\system32\wowcecli.dll
	HideUninstallerNa	REG_SZ	C:\Program Files\Insworks\exetgsvc
ES-Computing	a) InstallationId	REG_SZ	{X506b1c2-0b27-031d-1831-a5e0d5
Elezilla	a LegalNote	REG_SZ	http://adchannel.contextplus.net/le
	20 PageFiltering	REG_DWORD	0x0000002 (2)
GT2	ab PartnerId	REG_SZ	WB.CP
🖅 🧰 IDM Computer Solutions, Inc.	ServerAddress	REG_SZ	adchannel.contextplus.net
🕀 📄 InstallShield	Version	REG_SZ	2.0.128
🕀 💼 JPSoftware			
🕀 💼 L&H			
iameme			
Licenses			
🕀 📄 Microsoft			
🗄 📄 Nico Mak Computing			
DOBC			
Perl			
PowerQuest	]		

Ailien Registry\HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\CviP2ACmfQ3m (01-01-1970)

#### Using Regedit to load offline HIVES



My Computer\HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE



#### Using Regedit to load offline HIVES



🛃 WinDiff					_ 🗆 ×
<u>File E</u> dit	<u>V</u> iew	Expand	Options	Mar <u>k H</u> elp	
.\cleanso	oftwa	are.reg :	.\infecte	edsoftware.reg C:\INF\CleanSoftware.reg : C:\INF\InfectedSoftware.reg	Outline
		17340		@="\"C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore.exe\""	A
1-1	1	17341			
	1		!>	[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\CviP2ACmfQ3m]	
			!>	@=" 1 H4JUVVVVVV.79MI6EUVVVKXV0qv1w0 VMSMN8GbaV7LCP8LMVEGCHNGALWMSM"	
			ال ا	"Device"="\\\\.\\Udfsock"	
			Ð	"DriverPath"="C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\drivers\\kmintmgr.sys"	
			Ð	"DriverName"="SSDSnap"	
			Ð	"HideUninstallerName"="C:\\Program Files\\Insworks\\exetgsvc.exe"	
			Ð	"HD11"="C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\wowcecli.dll"	
			<u>اک</u>	"ServerAddress"="adchannel.contextplus.net"	
			<u>اک</u>	"LegalNote"="http://adchannel.contextplus.net/legal-note/nonbranded.html"	
			Ð	"PartnerId"="WB.CP"	
			<u>ا</u> ک	"InstallationId"="{X506b1c2-0b27-031d-1831-a5e0d582d5fa}"	
			<u>ا</u> ک	"PageFiltering"=dword:00000002	
			ال ا	"CrMnTmt"=dword:0036ee80	
			I>	"ClientName"="C:\\Program Files\\Insworks\\cmuleacc.exe"	
			1>	"AutoUpdater"="C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\fsqeamci.exe"	
НН			<u>ا</u> ک	"Version"="2.0.128"	
			1>		
			<u>ا</u> >	[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\CviP2ACmfQ3m\AU2]	
			<u>ا</u> >	"AP"="/DUNM=\"\\\.\\Udfsock\" /INSC=\"AU\""	
			1>	"SU"="http://au.contextplus.net/services/AUServer"	
			<u>اک</u>	"NPT"="2006:12:07-12:35:10:578"	
			<u>ا</u> ک	@="'2006:12:06-13:35:10:640"	
ПП	1		<u>ا</u> ک		
			Ð	[HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SOFTWARE\CviP2ACmfQ3m\AU2\RGR]	
			Ð		
			Ð	[HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SOFTWARE\CviP2ACmfQ3m\AU2\RGR\Properties]	
			-I>	"CP.cu"=hex:43,50,2e,63,76,00,32,2e,30,2e,31,32,38,00,31,36,30,31,3a,30,31,3a,	N
			1>	30,31,2d,30,30,3a,30,30,3a,30,30,3a,30,30,30,00,00	
HH	1		1>	"CP.id"=hex:43,50,2e,69,64,00,7b,58,35,30,36,62,31,63,32,2d,30,62,32,37,2d,30,	N I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
			1>	33,31,64,2d,31,38,33,31,2d,61,35,65,30,64,35,38,32,64,35,66,61,7d,00,31,36,	
			D	30,31,33,30,31,33,30,31,20,30,30,33,30,30,33,30,30,30,30,30,30,00,0	

#### **Using Regedit to load offline HIVES**



#### Downside....

- You will need to load 'each' HIVE (software, security, etc...) and export each one separately as a .reg file. Then run windiff on each (base vs. infected vs. cleaned)
- They could each be +/- 20MB in size
- When using ARV and you export 'all' of the HIVES as one .reg file, the size is roughly 2MB

#### Example with Trojan.Ascesso



🛃 W	/inDiff	F				
Eile	<u>E</u> dit	⊻iew	Expand	Options	Mar <u>k</u>	Help
Afil	es c	lean.t	txt∶.\file	s afte	er.txt C:	\TEMP\Ascesso\before\files clean.txt : C:\TEMP\Ascesso\new\files after.txt
•	=	=	1	9515	,	C:\WINDOWS\River Sumida.bmp
			1	9516		C:\WINDOWS\Santa Fe Stucco.bmp
			1	9517		C:\WINDOWS\SchedLqU.Txt
			1	9518		C:\WINDOWS\sessmqr.setup.log
			1	9519		C:\WINDOWS\SET3.tmp
	H-	<u> </u>	19	9520		C:\WINDOWS\SET4.tmp
			19	9521		C:\WINDOWS\SET8.tmp
			1	9522		C:\WINDOWS\setupact.log
			1	9523		C:\WINDOWS\setupapi.log
			19	9524		C:\WINDOWS\setuperr.log
			1	9525		C:\WINDOWS\setuplog.txt
					<u>ا</u>	C:\WINDOWS\smsys.dat
			1	9526		C:\WINDOWS\Soap Bubbles.bmp
			1	9527		C:\WINDOWS\Sti_Trace.log
			1	9528		C:\WINDOWS\system.ini
				9529		C:\WINDUWS\tabletoc.log
				9530		C:\WINDUWS\IASKMAN.EXE
				9531		C:\WINDUWS\tsoc.log
				9532		C:\WINDUWS\TWaln.dll
				9533		C:\WINDUWS\Twurk_46_ava
				9534		C:\WINDOWS\LWUNK_TO.EXE
				9535		C:\WINDOWS\LWUIK_32.2X2
			11	9930   0527		C.\WINDOWS\UC.FIF
			1	9231		C:\WINDOWS\UD:INI
			1	9530		C:\WINDOWS\UBBREA32 d]]
			1	9540		C:\VINDOWS\wiadebug.log
			1	9541		C:\WINDOWS\wiaservc.log
		Η	1	9542		C:\WINDOWS\win.ini
			1	9543		C:\WINDOWS\WindowsShell.Manifest
			1	9544		C:\WINDOWS\WindowsUpdate.log
			1	9545		C:\WINDOWS\winheln_exe

#### Example with Trojan.Ascesso



📕 filemon.txt - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

#### Summary of written/modified files:

File	PID	Process name
File C: C:\\$Directory C:\DOCUME~1\ADMINI~1\LOCALS~1\Temp\Perflib_Perfdata_95c.dat C:\DOCUME~1\ALLUSE~1\APPLIC~1\Symantec\SPBBC\BBNotify.log C:\DOCUME~1\ALLUSE~1\APPLIC~1\Symantec\SPBBC\SPPolicy.log C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\WcSystem.bak C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\WcSystem.wc C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\Wcw.bak C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\Wcw.tmp C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\wcw.tmp C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\wcwfscatindex.bak	PID 3340 3340 1560 1560 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260	<pre>Process name (symlcsvc.exe) (symlcsvc.exe) (csvcHst.exe) (ccSvcHst.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe)</pre>
C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\wcwfscatindex.wcw C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\wcwfssnap.bak C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\wcwfssnap.wcw C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\wcwregcatindex.bak C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\wcwregsnap.bak C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\wcwregsnap.bak C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\wcwregsnap.wcw C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\wcwregsnap.wcw C:\INSTALLED\WCW\NAV07_VM\wcwregsnap.wcw C:\INSTALLED\WCW\wcwservlog.txt C:\Program Files\Common Files\Symantec Shared\CCPD-LC\symlcrst.dll C:\Program Files\Common Files\Symantec Shared\SNDFW.log	1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260 1260	<pre>(wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (wcwService.exe) (symlcsvc.exe) (ccSvcHst.exe)</pre>
C:\WINDOWS\Prefetch\2.EXE-OF/AC23C.pf C:\WINDOWS\System32\Drivers\Beep.sys C:\WINDOWS\System32\Drivers\Cdaudio.sys C:\WINDOWS\system32\CatRoot2\edb.chk C:\WINDOWS\system32\CatRoot2\edb.log C:\WINDOWS\system32\CatRoot2\tmp.edb C:\WINDOWS\system32\CatRoot2\{F750E6C3-38EE-11D1-85E5-00C04FC295EE}\catdb C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\software C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\software C:\WINDOWS\system32\config\software.LOG C:\WINDOWS\system32\dllcache\beep.sys C:\WINDOWS\system32\dllcache\beep.sys.new C:\WINDOWS\system32\dllcache\cdaudio.sys C:\WINDOWS\system32\dllcache\cdaudio.sys.new	1080 2844 2844 1080 1080 1080 3340 3340 708 708 708 708 708	<pre>(svchost.exe) (2.exe) (2.exe) (svchost.exe) (svchost.exe) (svchost.exe) (svchost.exe) (svchost.exe) (symlcsvc.exe) (symlcsvc.exe) (winlogon.exe) (winlogon.exe) (winlogon.exe) (winlogon.exe) (winlogon.exe)</pre>





- Need to employ offline analysis techniques in order to capture all traces created by the threat under test
- Be aware that some monitoring tools could *miss* these traces and cannot be relied upon in all cases
- Don't rely on the product under test to dictate the final results. Use 3<sup>rd</sup> party tools to verify your findings





## THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME!

### Questions???