



TECHNISCHE
UNIVERSITÄT
DARMSTADT

We know what you did this summer: Android Banking Trojan exposing its sins in the cloud

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Eric Bodden (TU Darmstadt / Fraunhofer SIT)

Carlos Castillo (Intel Security)

Alex Hinchliffe (Intel Security)

Stephan Huber (Fraunhofer SIT)





Siegfried Rasthofer

- 3rd year PhD-Student at TU Darmstadt
- Research interest in Static-/dynamic code analyses
- Found 2 AOSP exploits, various App security vulnerabilities



Prof. Dr. Eric Bodden

- Professor at TU Darmstadt
- Research interest in Static-/dynamic code analyses
- Heading the Secure Software Engineering Group at Fraunhofer SIT and Technische Universität Darmstadt



Carlos Castillo


- Mobile Security Researcher at Intel Security.
- Hacking Exposed 7 co-author (Hacking Android).
- ESET Latin America's Best Antivirus Research winner 2009.



Alex Hinchliffe


- Mobile Security Research Manager at Intel Security
- Co-developer of cloud based Anti-Malware technology, Artemis
- Project partner of MobSec, S²Lab, Royal Holloway University, London

Backend-as-a-Service




56 Mio. data records
“publicly” available
(BlackHat EU 2015)

Backend-as-a-Service



Backend-as-a-Service (1)




Parse
The Cloud Application Platform


amazon
webservices™

cloudmine


...

Backend-as-a-Service (2)





ID Keys != Authentication Keys!




```
Parse.initialize(this, APPLICATION_ID, CLIENT_KEY);
```

```
ParseObject sms = new ParseObject("Intercepted SMS");
```


```
sms.put("message", "Hi VB2015");
```

Use Proper Access Control Rules on the Server Side!


HAVOC: Automatic Exploit Generator




Malware using Facebook's Parse




OpFake – App Execution and Main Service




OpFake – System Alarm every Minute




OpFake – Execute New tasks



OpFake – SMS Message Received




NewTasks Schema



Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts

NewTasks – Commands received

■ commands ■ sms ■ intercept ■ new_server ■ install



Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts

NewTasks – Examples of commands delivered

sms

- send sms to number 900 with content “BALANS”
- send sms to number 900 with content <confirmation_code>
- send sms to number 3116 with content “card <card_number> <exp_month> <exp_year> <CVV>”

intercept

- on/off

new_server


- hxxp://newwelcome00.ru
- hxxp://newwelcome00.ru

install

- Android/OpFake delivering Android/Marry:
 - hxxp://newwelcome00.ru/appru.apk (marry.adobe.net.threadsync).
 - hxxp://newwelcome00.ru/app.apk (marry.adobe.net.nightbuid).
- hxxp://notingen.ru/Player.apk (com.adobe.net)
- hxxp://швждаыдлпждв

Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts

NewTasks – Command created by date



SmsReceived Schema


SmsReceived Record

body	from	objectId	intype	is_card	updatedAt	type	createdAt
------	------	----------	--------	---------	-----------	------	-----------

- from: origin of the text message (phone number/company name)
- intype: incoming/outgoing
- to: device identifier of the infected device
- is_card: true/false if the message contains a credit card number
- type:
 - service: origin is a company (e.g. MegaFon)
 - other: origin is another phone number (personal messages)


Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts

SmsReceiver – # Intercepted SMS messages




Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts

SmsReceiver – Credit card numbers in incoming SMS messages




Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts

SmsReceived – Messages by date




TaskManager Schema



Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts

TaskManager – Command Executed



Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts

TaskManager – Examples of tasks executed

sms 900 (Sberbank):

- Get list of connected cards and commands available: sms INFO
- BALANS/BALANCE <card>
- Payment of services: sms <amount>

sms 000100 (MegaFon)

- B (balance)

sms 7878 (Beeline):


- Pay credit card: <Brand> <card_number> <amount>

Smishing (newwelcome00.ru)

- Russia: У вас 1 непрочитанное сообщение (You have 1 unread message) [hxxps://tinyurl.com/phelju3](https://tinyurl.com/phelju3)
- Russia: Ваша ссылка для скачивания (Your download link) [hxxp://goo.gl/TR5GjP](https://goo.gl/TR5GjP)
- Uzbekistan: Получено новое (Received new MMC) [hxxp://goo.gl/RINTTQ](https://goo.gl/RINTTQ)

Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts

Targeted Companies – Task (TaskManager table) in Account D




Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts

Sberbank commands – Tasks (TaskManager table) in Account D

Command	Format	Response
BALANCE/BALANS/баланс	BALANS <4-last-digits>	VISA1234 Balance: <amount>
INFO/СПРАВКА	СПРАВКА	List of connected cards: VISA1234(ON);
ПЕРЕВОД/PEREVOD/ПЕРЕВЕСТИ (Transfer)	ПЕРЕВОД <4digits_card_origin> <4digits_card_destination> or <phone_number_destination> <amount>	To transfer <amount> from card VISA1234 the recipient <name> must send the code <code> to the number 900
ZAPROS (Request)	ZAPROS <phone_number> <amount>	Request transfer for <amount> to your card VISA4321 has been sent. After confirmation by the sender <name> the money will go to your account.
TEL/PLATEZ/PHONE/ПОП ОЛНИ/PLATI (Pay mobile account)	TEL <phone_number> <amount>	To pay with card VISA1234 phone <company> <phone_number> the amount <amount> send the code <code> to number 900.

Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts

Top Sberbank Commands – Task (TaskManager table) in Account D




Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts

Sberbank Responses – Tasks (TaskManager table) in Account D

Type	Response
Balance	VISA1234 Balance: <amount>
Info	List of connected cards: VISA1234(ON);
Tel Asked	To pay with card VISA1234 phone <company> <phone_number> the amount <amount> send the code <code> to number 900.
Tel Processed	VISA1234 <date> <time> payment for services <amount> <operator> <phone_number> Balance: <amount>
Transfer Processed	MAES1234: Transfer <amount> to the card recipient <name> is processed
Transfer Accepted	VISA1234: <time> Amount <amount> from the sender <name> received. Balance: <amount>
Transfer Asked	To transfer <amount> from card VISA1234 the card recipient <name> should send the code <code> to number 900.



Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts

Top Sberbank fraud responses – Task (TaskManager table) - Account D



Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts


TaskManager – Command executed by date



Exposed Malware Parse.com Accounts

Unique Device IDs per table

■ NewTasks ■ SmsReceiver ■ TaskManager



Responsible Disclosure



2015-08-03: Reported finding to Facebook
2015-08-05: Facebook replied with “... *This issue does not qualify as a part of our bounty program...*”



2015-08-05: Facebook asked for more details
2015-08-06: We provided more details and Facebook blocked all Parse accounts
2015-08-28: Facebook offered room for collaboration



Facebook's responsible disclosure system only works with a Facebook account

Conclusions

- This Android Banking Trojans are actively performing financial fraud via SMS messages targeting Eastern Europe countries.
- Just like legitimate developers, Android malware authors also expose cloud accounts with sensitive (personal/financial) stolen information.
- Sensitive information stolen from victims by Android malware can be accessed by “anyone” without any authentication.



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